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**General Assembly
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Agenda item 34**

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 28 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the Russian Foreign Minister's visit to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander Lomaia
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

**Annex to the identical letters dated 28 April 2011 from the
Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

**Statement issued on 28 April 2011 by the Georgian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on the Russian Foreign Minister's visit to
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region**

On 25 and 26 April 2011, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, went on a "regional tour" of Georgia's occupied territories — Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.

The Russian Foreign Minister held meetings with the leaders of the occupying regimes and signed agreements with the latter — agreements which, according to international law, are as null and void as any other agreement or document concluded between an occupying country and the occupying regimes it has set up.

It is both ironic and regrettable that a high-ranking Russian diplomat has had to stage such a comical spectacle as a visit to Georgia's occupied territories and meetings with the proxy leaders of the regimes which occupy them. The grotesque nature of this pathetic performance was further heightened by Mr. Lavrov being decorated by Mr. Kokoity, a notorious criminal.

Such official "visits" to a sovereign country's occupied territories — reminiscent of the style of Soviet political leaders — could be viewed as a cynical provocation, as, in carrying out such visits, Russia seems to be demonstrating that it never intended to comply with the commitments it undertook under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in demonstrative defiance of universally recognized norms and principles of international law. At the same time, the Kremlin is trying to create at least an illusion of legitimacy on behalf of the occupying regimes — particularly considering the fact that, despite Russia's consistent efforts and financial generosity, its policy of recognition of the breakaway regions as subjects of international law has met with complete failure.

Equally cynical is the claim that Russia allegedly intends to protect the occupying regimes it set up on Georgia's occupied territories from "further aggression" by Georgia. Mr. Lavrov clearly needs to be reminded that the international community praised Georgia's undertaking to commit to the non-use of force, and that it demands the same from Russia despite the latter country's insistent refusal to do so. Through its militarization of the territories it occupies — including the deployment of multiple-launch rocket systems — it is Russia which poses a threat to peace and stability in the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions.

It is high time for the Kremlin to realize that the present-day world will no more tolerate the redrawing of an internationally recognized sovereign country's borders by force than it would policies of ethnic cleansing, occupation and annexation. The establishment of equal relations based upon the norms and principles of international law — which call for a full withdrawal from Georgia's occupied territories — would suit the interests of both countries.



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**General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 43
Question of Cyprus**

Security Council Sixty-sixth year

Letter dated 27 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 26 April 2011, addressed to you by Mr. Sertaç Güven, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ertuğrul Apakan
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 27 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of the letter dated 24 April 2011 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Derviş Eroğlu, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, regarding the anniversary of the separate simultaneous referenda that were held in two parts of Cyprus on 24 April 2004 (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sertaç Güven
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure

On the occasion of the anniversary of the separate simultaneous referenda that were held in the two parts of Cyprus on 24 April 2004, I have the honour to bring to your kind attention the following.

At the outset, I wish to point out that 24 April 2011 has a significance, for the Turkish Cypriots, beyond being the seventh anniversary of the above-mentioned referenda on the United Nations Comprehensive Settlement Plan. This date is also a reminder of the broken promises that were made to the Turkish Cypriots and the resultant disappointments and difficulties we have since faced.

As will be recalled, the Turkish Cypriots had cast a "yes" vote in the referendum held in the North, whereas the Greek Cypriots voted "no" in the referendum held in the South. It was by no means an easy decision for the Turkish Cypriots to approve, in that referendum, the Annan Plan, which was a recipe for a settlement that involved great pain, hardships and concessions for them, including displacement for the second, third or even fourth time. On the other hand, as indicated by the report of the then-United Nations Secretary-General dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), "the sheer size of the 'No' vote raises even more fundamental questions" as to whether the Greek Cypriot side was ready for a settlement on the basis of "political equality and the sharing of power". It was underlined in the same report that "if the Greek Cypriots are ready to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriots in a federal structure based on political equality, this needs to be demonstrated, not just by word, but by action". It is unfortunate to observe that seven years later, the Greek Cypriot side is still unable to take concrete steps in that direction.

As is also known, the United Nations Secretary-General and the European Union Commission, as well as the international community in general, had then stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side should not be victimized by the lack of a settlement, and that the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots should be lifted. Promises were made, decisions were taken and calls were made to that end. Unfortunately, however, these promises have not been kept and the Turkish Cypriots have been left to live under inhuman isolation that has been continuing for over 45 years.

I would once again like to draw Your Excellency's attention to this long-continuing predicament of the Turkish Cypriot people and to reiterate that the unfavourable experiences since 2004 have created great disappointment among the Turkish Cypriot people. The attitude displayed by the Greek Cypriot side both during and after 2004, while not changing the political will of the Turkish Cypriot people for a settlement, has played a primary role in an inevitable erosion of their belief that a settlement will actually materialize. These experiences and the consequent lack of confidence necessitate that greater caution be exercised so as to ensure that any comprehensive settlement can be viable and lasting. The Turkish Cypriot people have elected me to try to find not a settlement within which their rights and interests will depend on mere verbal assurances that may soon be forgotten or cast aside, but one in which these rights and interests will be firmly guaranteed without any dilution.

We, as the Turkish Cypriot side, are participating in the negotiations that are conducted within Your Excellency's mission of good offices, by drawing lessons

from the experiences of 2004, while at the same time looking ahead to the future. In spite of its negative vote in the referenda of 2004, the Greek Cypriot side was not left without an alternative and was in fact rewarded with European Union membership as the so-called "Republic of Cyprus". It is for this reason that if we succeed, with my counterpart Mr. Christofias, in coming up with a viable and sustainable settlement agreement, it is necessary that precautions be taken so that the experiences of 2004 and afterwards are not repeated. This is a requirement of reason, fairness and justice.

The Turkish Cypriot side recognizes that the real remedy for all problems related to the Cyprus issue is a mutually agreed comprehensive settlement. No other alternative could be a real substitute for this. A just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question will greatly contribute to peace and stability in the whole Eastern Mediterranean region and will be to the benefit of all the relevant parties. The Greek Cypriot side, however, does not seem to genuinely desire a successful conclusion to the comprehensive negotiation process. As former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed in his aforementioned report of 28 May 2004, the Greek Cypriots must first decide whether they truly want a new partnership with the Turkish Cypriots. Only if this is the case will it be possible to achieve a comprehensive settlement. In fact, if appropriate motivation is provided to the Greek Cypriot side by the European Union and the international community, with the necessary political will, it would be possible to reach a solution in a short time.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress once again our commitment, as the Turkish Cypriot side, to the search for a negotiated solution in Cyprus, the path to which clearly lies in the finding of a mutually acceptable settlement agreement. The opportunity afforded to the Greek Cypriot side to overcome any difficulty arising from the lack of a settlement on the island by resorting to other means as the so-called "legitimate government" and by keeping the Turkish Cypriots under isolation is preventing it from favouring a comprehensive settlement based on compromise and concession.

I would like to reassure Your Excellency that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we will continue to take our place at the negotiating table in a constructive spirit of goodwill and work for a settlement under your auspices. My sincere hope and expectation is that, at the tripartite meeting with Your Excellency to be held in June, together we will take the necessary steps for the achievement of a viable and lasting settlement that would take into account the past experiences and present realities, without further delay.

(Signed) Derviş Eroğlu
President

**Security Council**

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Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia**I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statements by the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30) and 10 March 2011 (S/PRST/2011/6) and Security Council resolutions 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009) and 1910 (2010), and as specified in paragraph 20 of resolution 1964 (2010), in which the Council requested me to report on all aspects of the resolution every four months. This report provides an update on major developments in Somalia since my report of 30 December 2010 (S/2010/675) until 15 April 2011 and assesses the political, security, human rights and humanitarian situation as well as progress made in implementing the United Nations strategy for Somalia. The report also covers the operational activities of the United Nations and the international community, as well as developments in counter-piracy activities further to my report of 27 October 2010 (S/2010/556).

II. Main developments in Somalia

2. During the reporting period, the Transitional Federal Government and its allies, with the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched a major offensive in Mogadishu and areas of southern central Somalia and successfully gained ground against Al-Shabaab. Consultations on modalities to end the transitional period intensified, while infighting within the transitional federal institutions continued. Drought and the ongoing security operations compounded an already dire humanitarian situation.

A. Political developments

3. Consultations accelerated on the next political dispensation to follow the end of the transitional period in August 2011. Following the decision of the seventeenth extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 30 January 2011 calling for the "urgent need to extend" the term of the Parliament, the Transitional Federal Parliament decided on 4 February to extend its term for three years. On 27 March, the Council of Ministers of the Transitional Federal Government announced its intention to effectively extend itself by one year, until August 2012.



4. The decision by the Transitional Federal Parliament led to a rift between President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan. The President, citing a provision in Somalia's 1960 constitution, refused to sign the extension bill, arguing that the decision had been taken without proper consultation. The Speaker insisted that the President was obliged to sign the bill since the motion had been passed with a two-thirds majority, in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter.

5. The terms of the extension as promulgated include the introduction of reforms, including rendering parliament more functional, completing the constitution-making process and holding elections for the President and the Speaker before the end of the transition. The President, however, stated that the term of the Transitional Federal Government must also be extended to allow it to complete key transitional tasks, particularly the constitution-making process and stabilizing the security situation in the country.

6. The decision by the Transitional Federal Parliament to extend itself also prompted a negative reaction from various partners, as well as a small demonstration in Mogadishu. On 5 February, "Puntland" condemned the decision, saying that it could prevent the country from moving to a successful post-transitional period. Partners and international stakeholders described the extension of the Transitional Federal Parliament as unilateral and said that the decision had been taken without consultations and necessary reforms. My Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, is leading discussions with the transitional federal institutions, regional stakeholders and international partners on the arrangements to end the transition. In the spirit of facilitating dialogue and consensus among the Somalis, the Special Representative convened and facilitated a consultative meeting in Nairobi on 12 and 13 April, which was attended by the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Presidents of the regional administrations of "Puntland", Galguduud and Mudug, leaders of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, and members of the international community.

7. The Transitional Federal Government refined its road map in January and produced a ministerial action plan as well as a work programme for the first 100 days of its term. Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, in his address to the Security Council on 10 March, however, noted that his administration was changing the political landscape in Somalia. He said that the Transitional Federal Government had significantly increased revenue collection at the Mogadishu seaport and airport, established an anti-corruption task force, and enhanced delivery of public services, including improved public safety and new or improved health services, schools, street lighting and refuse collection services. The Prime Minister also noted Transitional Federal Government achievements in resolving the fighting between Saad (Habargadir) and Omar Mohamud (Majerteen) clans in the northern regions of southern central Somalia and "Puntland". He held that the ongoing joint security operations with the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a showed that the agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a was being implemented.

8. In a surprise move, President Sharif dismissed the heads of the army, police, intelligence and prison services on 7 March. The President accused the commanders of being corrupt and said that there was a need to streamline the operations of the security organs. New chiefs were appointed on 29 March.

9. The Transitional Federal Government's relations with "Puntland" worsened after the latter severed relations on 16 January and barred the political leadership and civil servants of the Transitional Federal Government from entering "Puntland" territory on 23 January. "Puntland" accused the Transitional Federal Government of failing to consult it properly and of obstructing its participation in a meeting planned by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in Djibouti. "Puntland" further accused the Transitional Federal Government of failing to honour the August 2009 Gaalkacyo Agreement and to allocate the "Puntland" administration development funds it received.

10. Both "Puntland" and "Somaliland" continued to consolidate the delivery of services to their respective populations. Tension between the two regions developed as a result of fighting between the "Somaliland" forces and militias belonging to Sool-Sanaag-Cayn, which were reportedly backed by neighbouring "Puntland".

B. Security situation

11. A major military offensive against Al-Shabaab began on 19 February. In Mogadishu, Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by AMISOM, have made and continue to hold significant territorial gains, despite repeated counter-attacks. They destroyed a network of tunnels and trenches used by Al-Shabaab. Significant casualties have been reported on both sides.

12. The offensive by the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a and other groups allied with the Transitional Federal Government against Al-Shabaab in southern central Somalia has focused on the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border. Hostilities have centred on the Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions, with armed conflict most prevalent in Bula Hawa and, to a lesser extent, in the vicinity of Beletweyne and Dolo. Clashes are expected in other key strategic towns within the Hiraan region. The Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a continues to adopt a defensive posture in Dhuusamarreeb, while also continuing to provide security assurances to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for access to those areas under its control.

13. Troops allied with the Transitional Federal Government took control of the town of Dhobley, close to the Kenyan border, on 3 April. Al-Shabaab reportedly moved most of its forces from the Kenya-Somalia border to strengthen the defence of the port of Kismaayo.

14. Reports of heavy casualties and intensified recruitment efforts on the part of Al-Shabaab suggest that the group's capabilities may have been reduced through attrition. Al-Shabaab continues to receive arms and ammunition through southern Somali ports and acquires financial resources from extortion, illegal exports and taxation.

15. In February in Mogadishu, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated outside a Transitional Federal Government police training facility, resulting in several casualties, including civilians. On 21 February, Al-Shabaab launched a suicide car bomb attack on a police camp at Hamar Jabab district. Eleven people, including policemen and civilians, were killed with 40 others injured.

16. Disagreement over water holes in the disputed area of Buuhoodle led to fighting in late February between the "Somaliland" army and Sool-Sanaag-Cayn militias; the latter was reportedly backed by "Puntland" forces. A tentative ceasefire

has held since March, aided by "Puntland's" withdrawal and "Somaliland" peacebuilding measures. However, Buuhoodle remains a militarized zone, and the conflict may resume as competition for water resources and pasture in drought-affected areas increases.

C. Piracy

17. Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia increased to unprecedented levels during the reporting period. As of 15 April 2011, pirates had launched 113 attacks. Reports from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) indicate that as of 15 April, 550 people and 26 vessels were being held hostage in Somalia. The level of violence employed by the pirates, as well as their geographic reach, has continued to increase.

18. On 10 January, following the completion of his mandate, my Special Adviser on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia, Jack Lang, submitted his report (S/2011/30). It highlighted the urgent need to establish effective judicial capacity for piracy trials in Somalia and suggested an additional Somali court located outside Somalia. It also recommended that Somalia consider reviewing and, if appropriate, updating its national legislation on maritime zones, with United Nations assistance.

19. On 3 February, I attended the launch of the IMO World Maritime Day theme for 2011: "Piracy: orchestrating the response", in London.

20. On 16 February in London, with the support of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Nations brought together high-level representatives of the Transitional Federal Government, "Puntland", "Somaliland" and southern central Somalia for a meeting on piracy, under the framework of the Kampala process. The last such meeting was held in April 2010. The representatives committed to continue regular exchanges in the framework of the Kampala process this year.

21. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has been tracking some 940 Somali men held for trial on piracy-related charges in 17 countries, most of whom have been arrested in the past year. Kenya and Seychelles continued to receive piracy suspects for trial. A significant step towards repatriating Somali prisoners to their own country was the signing of a prisoner transfer agreement by the Seychelles and "Puntland" in March, supported by the Transitional Federal Government and facilitated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. This agreement and work of the Office on prisons in "Somaliland" and "Puntland" represent a significant step towards repatriating Somali prisoners to their own country.

22. On 28 March, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime handed over to "Somaliland" a prison in Hargeysa that holds pirates convicted by the courts in "Somaliland", as well as other criminals. The prison meets international minimum standards, has a holding capacity of 465, and was refurbished at a cost of \$1.5 million, partly funded by the trust fund to support initiatives of states countering piracy off the coast of Somalia.

23. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia held its eighth plenary meeting in New York on 21 March 2011 under the chairmanship of Turkey. It

stressed the need, inter alia, for (a) a comprehensive approach to combating piracy, through efforts on land as well as at sea; (b) multiple approaches to prosecute and incarcerate pirates and their leaders and financiers; (c) more resources, especially through contributions to the trust fund to support initiatives of states countering piracy off the coast of Somalia; (d) ship owners and operators to implement industry-developed best management practices; (e) a continuous robust military response; and (f) Somalia itself to play a critical role in this effort, and for Somali authorities to adopt and implement anti-piracy legislation.

D. Humanitarian situation

24. The number of people in Somalia needing humanitarian assistance and livelihood support has reached 2.4 million, an increase of 20 per cent over the previous six months. Somalis have been adversely affected by continued civil insecurity, displacement and food insecurity. Recent nutrition surveys have shown a steady rise in global acute malnutrition rates, particularly in southern central Somalia, with rates increasing from 17.9 to 25 per cent in Gedo region and from 25 to 30 per cent in Juba region in less than six months. One in four children in southern Somalia is acutely malnourished.

25. Drought and conflict have been the main reasons for new displacements. Nearly 55,000 people have been displaced owing to drought since December 2010. Many are moving to urban areas in search of assistance. Increased insecurity in many parts of southern central Somalia during the reporting period caused further displacement. The fighting in Bula Hawa resulted in displacements into Ethiopia and Kenya, although most had returned to Bula Hawa at the time of reporting.

26. In Mogadishu, almost 16,000 people were displaced in the first two months of the year owing to heavy fighting. Two cases of cholera were confirmed in Mogadishu in March.

27. The escalation of conflict in southern central Somalia is exacerbating the suffering caused by insufficient rainfall during the period from October to December (Deyr rains). It is expected that rainfall levels will be poor in the period from April to June (Gu rains), possibly resulting in a further deterioration of food security, particularly in southern central Somalia.

E. Human rights and protection of civilians

28. According to hospital sources in Mogadishu, 62 civilians were killed and 232 wounded within the first two weeks of the February offensive. For the most part, the information available does not allow for a definitive attribution to either party. Al-Shabaab reportedly launched deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including through shelling, in violation of humanitarian law. Poor command and control over Transitional Federal Government forces and the loose integration of militia and clan-based divisions led to a series of incidents resulting in civilian casualties. At least 16 people were killed during a shoot-out among Transitional Federal Government security forces in January. The Government publicly regretted the incident and arrested five individuals.

29. The human rights situation has not improved in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab. UNPOS received reports of at least six summary executions, mostly for alleged linkages with the Transitional Federal Government. It also received allegations of torture and other inhumane punishment, including three amputations and five floggings of individuals.

30. The United Nations has facilitated assistance to the Somali authorities on the preparation of their national report to the universal periodic review. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNPOS also organized, in collaboration with Djibouti and Italy, a workshop on the universal periodic review from 15 to 17 February 2011 in Djibouti, which was attended by seven Transitional Federal Government ministers.

31. The "Somaliland" Human Rights Commission has focused on complaints of arbitrary arrest and detention. In "Puntland", relations improved between the media and the administration following the release of imprisoned journalists. However, since January, over 250 persons, mainly male internally displaced persons from southern central Somalia, have been rounded up in Boosaaso or arrested at checkpoints in Garoowe and brought to Gaalkacyo, with the aim of preventing Al-Shabaab from infiltrating the region.

32. There were significant reports of sexual violence in "Somaliland" and "Puntland" during the reporting period, which both recognize as a criminal act. Some 140 incidents were reported from January to early March, of which 99 were rape cases. Such cases were mostly dealt with through the customary law system. Settlements reached out of court may result in either marriage with the offender or the survivor's removal from the community. During his February visit to "Somaliland" and "Puntland", the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia met with women's organizations and survivors of such violence. They noted that while the customary system contributes to ensuring peace between clans, it would not ensure proper redress for victims.

F. Child protection

33. The widespread and systematic recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in southern central Somalia continues to be of serious concern. Child recruitment patterns are significantly more aggressive on the part of Al-Shabaab. At the time of writing, 80 defectors from Al-Shabaab, half of them children, were reportedly held in a Government "cantonment" area in Mogadishu. A mission of the task force on defectors to Mogadishu from 19 to 26 March was granted access to meet the defectors. UNICEF is seeking the Government's support to allow access for child protection partners to ensure that the humanitarian needs and basic international standards for protection are met, including the immediate separation of children from adults.

34. As a result of the hostilities, 8 children were reportedly killed and 69 maimed, mostly in Mogadishu. Fifty-three cases of rape and sexual violence against children were also reported, mostly in "Somaliland", where monitoring capacity and access are much greater.

35. As a follow-up to the visit to Somalia and Kenya in November 2010 of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, a State Minister was

appointed focal point for child protection and human rights on 18 December 2010. However, children remain present within the Transitional Federal Government security forces and its allied militias. UNPOS is taking measures to establish its child protection capacity, which, among other things, should assist the Transitional Federal Government to put in place vetting standards and procedures to assess the age of recruits.

III. Activities of the United Nations and the international community

A. International support

36. The Assembly of the African Union, at its sixteenth ordinary session, held on 30 and 31 January 2011, endorsed the decision of the seventeenth extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of IGAD on Somalia concerning the need to extend the term of the Transitional Federal Parliament. The Assembly of the African Union reiterated its call to the Security Council to provide greater support to AMISOM and fully assume its responsibilities towards Somalia, including the provision of funding through United Nations assessed contributions for the payment of troop allowances and reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment. Furthermore, the Assembly called on the United Nations to deploy an operation to take over AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia.

37. On 31 January, together with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, I convened a high-level meeting on Somalia in Addis Ababa. The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and Chairman of IGAD, Meles Zenawi. The participants reiterated the need to complete the outstanding tasks of the transition, bearing in mind the 20 August 2011 deadline. The Chairman of IGAD stated that the gains made in the peace process must be preserved and that the transitional institutions should remain in place beyond August 2011. The participants called for unity and cohesion among the transitional federal institutions, for broadening of the Transitional Federal Government political outreach and reconciliation and for completion of the transitional tasks, particularly the constitution-making process. They also called for increased international assistance and for coordinated support to the Transitional Federal Government, the strengthening of AMISOM and increased access for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

38. The United Kingdom organized a conference on Somalia at Wilton Park from 6 to 9 February. The conference, which my Special Representative attended, discussed modalities to end the transition in Somalia. The discussions were dominated by the recent decision of the Transitional Federal Parliament to extend itself. Participants agreed on the need for the people of Somalia to own and lead the transition process, with the continued support of the international community.

39. AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS signed a joint regional strategy on 23 February. The strategy outlines common political, security, humanitarian as well as institutional and financial issues and challenges affecting the Somali peace process and the management of the transition. The strategy is designed to enhance coordination, cooperation and information sharing between the three institutions, as well as with the international community and other partners.

40. On 10 March, the Special Representative for Somalia of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission reiterated his organization's requests to the Security Council, including authorization for maritime deterrence and air surveillance operations to prevent the entry into Somalia of foreign fighters and the delivery of ammunitions and equipment to the armed groups.

41. On 21 March, the European Union Foreign Affairs Council agreed that future support to the transitional federal institutions, including stipends for parliamentarians, should be contingent on progress on reform and delivery of the transitional tasks. The Council confirmed its readiness to contribute to the implementation of an agreed reform agenda for the transitional federal institutions on the basis of clear agreed benchmarks with a timeline for implementation. It also conveyed that it aimed to enhance support to regions of Somalia committed to peace, stability and democracy.

B. Constitution-making process

42. The United Nations has continued to support Somalia's efforts to draft a new constitution. In the last few months, UNPOS has had consultations with the transitional federal institutions, IGAD, the African Union and international partners to agree on a political road map for the finalization of the draft constitution. These discussions largely revolved around the identification of priority and divisive issues for consultation with the Somali people, modalities for adoption of the draft constitution and an implementation plan.

43. A political road map elaborating the broad steps of the various components of the process has been agreed upon. The road map sets out three pillars for the successful completion of the draft constitution. The first one is participation and active engagement and support of the country's political leadership at national and regional levels. The second pillar is ownership by the Somali people. The outcome of the constitution-making process must be a constitution that is supported by the Somali people, reflects their wishes and represents their views. The third pillar is continuity of commitment to the peace process. The Somali constitution process is essentially about reconciliation, peacebuilding, and nation-building. The process must reconcile and unite the Somali people in a common cause.

C. Targeted sanctions

44. During the reporting period, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea met on 9 February and on 11 March 2011.

45. At the 9 February meeting, the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea presented the Group's midterm briefing to the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 6 (j) of resolution 1916 (2010) focusing on a variety of threats to peace and stability, as well as continuing violations of the general and complete arms embargo. He noted that Al-Shabaab had transformed itself into an overt and largely self-sustaining entity that derived significant revenues from taxation, notably at the port of Kismaayo. He informed the Committee that the Group had also noted with concern the growing activities of private security companies in violation of the arms embargo.

46. On 11 March, the Committee received a briefing from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on the third 120-day report (S/2011/125) of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010). In his report, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator highlighted the fact that the ongoing complex humanitarian emergency in Somalia had been exacerbated by intense and prolonged fighting, civil insecurity, continued displacement and food insecurity caused by poor rains.

47. The Chairman of the Committee delivered the 120-day report, pursuant to paragraph 11 (g) of resolution 1844 (2008), to the Security Council on 15 March 2011. On 17 March 2011, the Security Council adopted resolution 1972 (2011) extending the "humanitarian carve-out" contained in paragraph 5 of resolution 1916 (2010) for 16 months.

IV. Implementation of resolution 1964 (2010)

A. Establishment of the United Nations presence in Somalia and "light footprint" in Mogadishu

48. The general security situation in Mogadishu remains unstable and hostile, thus affecting the safe conduct of United Nations operations. In the reporting period, the city continued to experience mortar and artillery shelling; roadside, vehicle borne, and suicide bomber improvised explosive devices; armed clashes; and hand grenade and stand-off attacks. There is still a very high risk for missions within Mogadishu, especially outside the Aden Adde International Airport area. The recent territorial gains secured by AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government have, however, considerably reduced the risk of indirect fire and mortar attacks against the airport and its immediate environs.

49. Three improvised explosive devices detonated and several others were discovered in Mogadishu in early 2011. There was a rise in hand grenade attacks against the Transitional Federal Government and facilities occupied by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Consequently, humanitarian operations in Mogadishu are still limited to critical life-saving activities.

50. On 4 April 2011, Prime Minister Mohamed addressed a letter to me concerning the United Nations presence in Somalia. He urged United Nations offices, agencies and funds to relocate to Somalia within 90 days to help support the Transitional Federal Government. In response to his call, my Special Representative met the Prime Minister and expressed the commitment of the United Nations to increase its presence in the country, particularly in Mogadishu, as soon as security and safety conditions allow. Currently, 850 United Nations staff are stationed in Somalia, including in the capital.

51. At the same time, the establishment of a "light footprint" in Mogadishu has progressed significantly since December 2010. The Department of Safety and Security has approved additional security compliant accommodations within the AMISOM protected area at the Aden Adde International Airport. In January, the authorized United Nations international staff ceiling for Mogadishu was increased from 14 to a maximum of 52 staff. The United Nations Mine Action Service, the

World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), the Department of Safety and Security and UNPOS currently maintain a presence of international staff members on a rotational basis, normally averaging 24 to 28 staff per day.

52. Meanwhile, the United Nations common compound, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) compound and the WFP facility at Mogadishu port continue to serve as accommodation and office space for United Nations national staff. About 60 United Nations staff members currently work and live in Mogadishu, of which about half are international staff residing at the Aden Adde International Airport for security reasons.

53. UNPOS has continued with the deployment of international staff to other regions to augment national staff there. Deployments have begun mainly to Hargeysa in "Somaliland", and to Garoowe in "Puntland".

Stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Mogadishu

54. Consistent with the three-track strategic approach in pursuit of political, security, and humanitarian and recovery objectives, and given the recent security gains, my Special Representative has stepped up efforts to coordinate the United Nations planning for the recovery and stabilization of Mogadishu. As part of this integrated approach, consultations are under way with the Transitional Federal Government to jointly agree on priorities that would deliver the maximum benefits to the people of Mogadishu. Efforts to mobilize international resources and support for immediate recovery are continuing.

55. The United Nations is providing technical expertise, financial support and staff to the Transitional Federal Government Ministries of Finance, Public Works and the Interior (which now includes humanitarian affairs), as well as the Benadir administration. United Nations agencies are rehabilitating and equipping the offices of the Ministries of Justice and Finance.

56. The United Nations provides employment for around 2,500 workers in Mogadishu to rehabilitate basic infrastructure, such as a hospital, a district administration office, markets, schools and roads. Approximately 40 per cent of these workers are women. The United Nations is also supporting Mogadishu district administrations to implement development projects in consultation with local communities.

57. The United Nations will continue to provide training, equipment and supplies and will support the Transitional Federal Government in taking on a stronger regulatory role in Mogadishu so that the quality of privately provided basic services can be assured. However, such assistance by the United Nations is limited by the lack of flexible and responsive funding.

B. Review of the strategy for Somalia and the United Nations coordinated approach

58. Coordination between UNPOS, UNSOA and the United Nations country team continued to improve. In response to my request in December 2010 to develop an integrated strategic framework for Somalia, my Special Representative, the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, and the Director of UNSOA finalized the

framework through a consultative process with the wider United Nations system. They developed a common analysis of the situation in Somalia and established a shared vision of the five main strategic objectives and priority results for peace consolidation over the next 12 months.

59. The main areas of common approach are: (a) ensuring a broad-based agreement on a new political dispensation with greater legitimacy; (b) supporting governance structures to function more effectively to incentivize peace and social justice; (c) improving community safety and security in areas under Transitional Federal Government control, as well as "Somaliland", "Puntland", Galguduud and Mudug in southern central Somalia; (d) continuing and expanding delivery of basic social services, while applying conflict-sensitive approaches; and (e) supporting the Transitional Federal Government and relevant regional authorities in developing national economic policies and strategies that provide equitable growth and address immediate conflict drivers. The integrated strategic framework will be monitored on a quarterly basis.

C. Strengthening the political process

60. As the end of the transitional period approaches, my Special Representative has intensified consultations with the various partners and stakeholders of the Somalia peace process. He has sought to reach a consensus on how to end the transition and on the next political dispensation. During the reporting period, he visited Mogadishu on three occasions to engage the leadership of the transitional federal institutions. He urged the leaders to remain united and focused on implementing key transitional tasks. Since taking office, my Special Representative has made two visits to "Somaliland" and "Puntland" to consult with the leadership. He intends to continue to visit the regions regularly.

61. On 10 March (see S/PRST/2011/6), the Security Council requested me to assess the efforts of the transitional federal institutions to reach an agreement on post-transitional arrangements in consultation with the international community. It called on the transitional federal institutions to conduct consultations in a more constructive, open and transparent manner that promotes broader political dialogue and participation in line with the spirit of the Djibouti Agreement. My Special Representative will continue to hold consultations aimed at finding consensus among the Somalis on determining the post-transition arrangements and respective responsibilities of all stakeholders.

62. In an effort to broaden outreach in Somalia, UNPOS, in cooperation with Finn Church Aid and the African Council for Religious Leaders held the second meeting with Somalia's religious and traditional leaders in Djibouti in February. The participants lamented the lack of: adequate Transitional Federal Government accountability to the population, social services at the community level and a consultation mechanism with the elders and clan leaders in the national reconciliation process. They called on AMISOM to adopt a broader mandate for the protection of civilians. The meeting was part of a consultative process that will continue throughout the year. UNPOS staff held a follow-up meeting in Mogadishu in March, in which leaders based in southern central Somalia gave their vision for the upcoming elders meetings.

63. In March, UNPOS sponsored the first conference for imams and religious leaders from all regions, which was organized by "Somaliland". The participants discussed issues of common concern, including terrorism, reinforcing national unity, and Islamic concepts and values.

D. Progress towards full deployment and strengthening of AMISOM

64. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1964 (2010), by which the Council requested the African Union to increase the AMISOM force strength from 8,000 to 12,000, Burundi and Uganda reaffirmed their commitment to deploy the additional 4,000 troops. As a first step, Burundi deployed an additional 1,000 troops in the first week of March 2011, bringing AMISOM strength to about 9,000. Coordination and preparations for the deployment of the additional battalions continue among the troop-contributing countries, the African Union Commission and other partners. While UNSOA coordinates support to AMISOM with the troop-contributing countries and partners on the ground, the United Nations Office to the African Union supports the African Union Commission in planning and managing AMISOM operations, including in assisting with force generation. Military planners of the United Nations Office to the African Union have participated in several predeployment visits and inspections to ensure the smooth insertion of troops.

65. UNSOA continues to deliver a logistical support package to AMISOM comprising basic supplies and equipment, engineering and construction, medical services, aviation and transportation, strategic and tactical telecommunications capability, public information support and training. However, there remain critical gaps in the support package that adversely impact the effectiveness of AMISOM. The United Nations trust fund in support of AMISOM can be used to provide funds to fill these critical gaps.

66. Construction supported by UNSOA has focused on five secure AMISOM locations in Mogadishu. UNSOA contractors have commenced construction of the coastal road linking the airport to the seaport and have made significant improvements to the AMISOM level II hospital.

67. Temporary offices and accommodation for AMISOM civilians and police that are compliant with minimum operating security standards are being co-located with the AMISOM interim force headquarters. The construction of permanent headquarters, which will accommodate the three AMISOM components, as well as United Nations staff, is under way. The permanent office and VIP conference buildings are set to be completed by June 2011, while the remaining facilities are planned to be completed by September 2011.

68. In line with its mandate, UNSOA intensified the tempo of its logistical support during the AMISOM-supported military offensives that commenced in February. UNSOA increased sealifts of essential materials and airlifted immediate operational requirements, delivering additional defensive materials and 9 tons of critical supplies. During this period, UNSOA provided 58 repatriation, medical evacuation and transfer flights from Mogadishu to Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, Uganda and South Africa. It airlifted 258 injured AMISOM personnel and flew mortal remains to Burundi and Uganda.

69. AMISOM has taken steps towards restricting operations that will indiscriminately harm civilians by refining its policy on the use of indirect fire. In February, the African Union deployed an international expert team to Mogadishu to assess the indirect fire practices of AMISOM with a view to mitigating civilian harm and making amends for civilian losses incurred during combat operations. The recommendations were broadly agreed by AMISOM; they will require increased capabilities for which the force would need international support and additional resources. Donor support for the proposed holistic approach to improving AMISOM operations and mitigating civilian harm is essential.

70. UNSOA has provided enhanced strategic communication support to AMISOM, including for the Mission's efforts to effectively respond to the issue of civilian casualties. Radio Bar Kulan, which is broadcasting around the clock in Mogadishu, is one of the three most popular radio stations, according to public opinion polls. An information support team is permanently co-located with AMISOM in Mogadishu. UNPOS and UNSOA have established a coordination mechanism to harmonize planning and implementation of cross-cutting strategic communications activities in support of Somalia's peace and security efforts.

71. The United Nations Office to the African Union has assisted AMISOM in recruiting civilian staff for the Mission, strengthening its public information offices and updating the AMISOM communications strategy and the strategy on the protection of civilians.

E. Strengthening of the Somali security institutions and development of a national security strategy

Policy and coordination

72. On 20 January, the Joint Security Committee met in Djibouti and agreed on priorities for security sector development during the transitional period. The Committee recommended a revision of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, which is to be adopted in six months. The revision would take into account the current threat and risk analysis and the recommendations of the 2010 security sector assessment. The four technical working groups of the Committee will work on the priorities, including justice, corrections, disarmament and recovery, mine action and reduction of armed violence, based on an agreed timetable and achievable benchmarks. Early this year, a team of 18 Somali security and military experts from the diaspora undertook a month-long assessment of the security sector, with the support of UNPOS. Their report will form the basis for the revision of the National Security and Stabilization Plan.

Military

73. UNPOS continues to assist the Transitional Federal Government in the development of its armed forces in line with the provisions of the Djibouti peace agreement. Regular meetings of the Military Technical Working Group of the Joint Security Committee allow UNPOS to offer strategic advice, facilitate international assistance and strengthen effective partnerships. The European Union training mission in Uganda completed the training for 1,000 Somali recruits in January 2011. These troops were subsequently deployed to Mogadishu and are currently at the Al-Jazzira camp undergoing integration training under the supervision of AMISOM.

The training of the second batch of 986 recruits was initiated in February. With the training of this second group, the European Union training mission will have completed its mandate.

74. Djibouti has indicated its willingness to deploy 300 trainers to assist Somalia in the restructuring and training of the National Security Force institutions.

75. Stipends for the Somali military are being paid regularly thanks to the funding made available by the United States of America and Italy. To address frequent changes in the payroll, the United States assisted the Transitional Federal Government to introduce a biometric database in January 2011.

Police

76. The training of 499 Somali police recruits at the Djibouti National Police Academy has been concluded. The training was part of a \$10 million capacity-building project to assist the Somali police force, carried out by UNPOS and funded by Japan. Police trainers from AMISOM, Somalia and Djibouti were involved in the training. UNPOS also provided communications equipment to support the Somali police radio communications network.

77. To enhance the role of Somali women in security, 83 of the 499 recruits of the Somali police force trained in Djibouti were female. The training also raised awareness on issues of women in peace and security.

78. In Mogadishu, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued to support the running costs of the police headquarters, its criminal investigations division and eight police stations. In January, UNDP completed the payment of stipends for 2,322 officers, covering arrears from September to December 2009. UNPOS, through Japanese funding, will cover payment of stipends for the period from January to May 2010. UNPOS is coordinating with key partners on an appropriate payment mechanism and on ensuring stipend payments from June 2010 on.

79. In February, UNDP supported the second national police convention in "Somaliland", which launched the second stage of the police reform process. In "Puntland" in March, UNDP supported a workshop on police reform and human rights to help initiate police reform.

Mine action

80. Following the completion of explosive ordnance disposal training in January, 56 Transitional Federal Government police were deployed for disposal operations in Mogadishu. They are assessing explosive remnants of war and stockpiles held at police stations in accessible areas for removal and disposal. Training for explosive detection dog handlers continued, with Transitional Federal Government dog handling teams deployed for the first time to secure entry points at the Aden Adde International Airport.

Justice and corrections

81. UNDP is providing training to judges, the Attorney General and court support staff to boost capacities in prosecuting and adjudicating serious criminal cases, including piracy. In 2010, 49 judges and prosecutors from "Somaliland" and

"Puntland" completed a nine-month training programme. Eighty-five judges commenced training in mid-March. UNDP provided office equipment and copies of laws to the assize court, which is mandated to hear piracy cases, in Boosaaso in March. Construction of the assize court in Hargeysa and a new prosecution office in Burao will be completed by April 2011.

82. The prisons in southern central Somalia fail to meet the minimum standards required under the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Prison officers lack proper training in human rights, rehabilitation and reintegration, and relevant international standards for the treatment of offenders.

83. UNDP commenced training members of the judiciary in Mogadishu in April 2011. It has procured equipment for the courts along with essential legal texts.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

84. While conditions for comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration do not yet exist in Somalia, the revitalized inter-agency working group on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Somalia will serve as a coordination body for the Joint Security Committee, in particular its technical working group on strategic planning and programming.

85. During the reporting period, the Transitional Federal Government informed UNPOS that it was seeking a solution for some 80 "defectors" from Al-Shabaab who were in its custody. The issue of defectors requires an evidence-based approach, as well as a sound government policy framework. A task force on defectors established by my Special Representative will coordinate international support to the transitional federal institutions in developing an appropriate approach to the issue of defectors, while addressing the urgent needs of the current reported caseload.

F. Humanitarian and recovery and development activities

Humanitarian activities

86. Agencies have scaled up their response to the ongoing drought. However, access challenges and the limited presence of the United Nations in the most affected areas continue to hamper the response, particularly in the south, where 80 per cent of the neediest people live. These challenges were assessed by my Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, during her first visit to Somalia in February 2011. She expressed concern about the impact of drought and conflict and the need to better ensure the protection of civilians.

87. In January, \$4.5 million from the Common Humanitarian Fund was allocated for emergency drought response. An additional \$15 million became available through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which is currently being disbursed. Recognizing the severity of the drought, an additional \$35 million was allocated from the Common Humanitarian Fund in February.

88. Countrywide, in January and February, 15,400 metric tons of food were distributed in Somalia, benefiting 840,000 people per month. In Mogadishu, 85,000 meals are provided daily to vulnerable people at 19 sites, an increase of 5,000 meals since December 2010. Supplementary feeding centres for malnourished children are providing interventions for 20,700 beneficiaries monthly in the country.

Fifteen mother and child health centres provide services to over 290,000 internally displaced and drought-affected persons. In February and March, 8,000 non-food item kits were distributed, including in Belet Hawo, and 1,200 tents were erected for newly displaced people. Over 483,000 residents and internally displaced persons are benefiting from the chlorination of 275 water sources. In Lower Shabelle, 17 mother and child health centres and over 20 health post facilities in eight districts provide maternal and child health services to over 120,000 drought-affected agro-pastoralists and internally displaced persons.

89. Child health days helped vaccinate 421,000 children under 5 years of age and 288,000 women in "Somaliland", and almost 150,000 children and 98,300 women in "Puntland". In "Somaliland", rapid response teams have been deployed and nine boreholes or springs have been rehabilitated, benefiting over 57,000 people. The rehabilitation of 11 strategic boreholes in drought-affected districts of "Puntland" is ongoing, benefiting over 65,000 people. Over 91,000 people in Wanlaweyn district in Lower Shabelle are benefiting from the distribution of water purification tablets, soaps and jerry cans. Educational supplies have been distributed in "Puntland" benefiting over 28,000 primary schoolchildren, of which 40 per cent are girls.

Recovery and development activities

90. The United Nations Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery, together with central and local government institutions, is working to improve the delivery of basic services countrywide through decentralized governance structures. In 2011, the Joint Programme continued work in 16 districts in and around Mogadishu; 6 districts of "Somaliland" and 4 districts in "Puntland".

91. In "Somaliland" and "Puntland", the participating local governments are implementing projects such as the installation of water schemes, construction of health facilities, building of community markets, establishment of garbage collection points and rehabilitation of urban roads. In "Puntland", the Peacebuilding Fund finances projects executed by UNDP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for \$3 million to support the police and public security reform and activities aimed at diffusing tensions and resettling internally displaced persons.

92. In January, the United Nations launched an inter-agency initiative aimed at creating sustainable livelihood opportunities. Agencies are planning to build slaughterhouses in Togdheer region, "Somaliland", and have begun training courses in honey processing and fodder production in Sool and Sanaag districts.

G. Gender issues

93. In mid-March, UNPOS hosted the first visit to Nairobi of the new Transitional Federal Government Minister of Gender. A number of areas of support to the Ministry of Gender were discussed, including engaging more women in peace and mediation, in outreach and reconciliation activities, in the fight against conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and in the ongoing constitutional review consultations.

94. From 8 to 10 February, UNPOS discussed the national gender policy with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Hargeysa, "Somaliland". From 5 to

10 March, three workshops on disseminating Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) were conducted by the Gender and Development Policy Institute based in Hargeysa, through a memorandum of understanding signed with UNPOS in December 2010 targeting Government officials, international NGOs, civil society organizations, research institutes and media representatives. The recommendations of 133 participants in attendance will contribute to an implementation framework in "Somaliland".

V. Resource mobilization

95. The European Union agreed to continue to provide financial support to AMISOM for the first half of 2011. As part of the agreement, it will provide an additional EUR 65.9 million to the African Union, bringing the total allocation to AMISOM to EUR 208 million since 2007. The European Union agreed to increase the allowance for AMISOM troops to United Nations levels and to continue to cover personnel and operational costs.

96. To date, the trust fund in support of AMISOM has received approximately \$38.3 million. During the reporting period, it received \$2 million from Saudi Arabia, \$1.8 million from Denmark for military (non-lethal) purposes, as well as \$3.8 million from the United Kingdom for military and medical purposes. The United Kingdom confirmed its intention to make a further contribution without caveats of \$2.5 million.

97. During the reporting period, the trust fund in support of the Somali security institutions has received a second contribution of \$10 million from Japan as part of its continuing support to the Somali police force. Of the total of \$22 million contributed to the trust fund since 2009, the fund has an uncommitted amount of \$400,000 million. Saudi Arabia has pledged a contribution of \$6 million.

98. Since its establishment in January 2010, the trust fund to support initiatives of states countering piracy off the coast of Somalia has received contributions totalling \$6.2 million. It is currently funding 12 projects totalling \$4.2 million. The United Arab Emirates co-hosted a fund-raising event in support of the trust fund on 19 April, in the margins of its international conference on piracy on 18 and 19 April in Dubai.

VI. Observations/recommendations

99. I welcome the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government to expand its area of control in Mogadishu to enhance security for its people. The Transitional Federal Government and its allies have also opened new fronts in southern central Somalia and taken control of major towns. In this regard, I pay tribute to the Governments of Burundi and Uganda for their continued sacrifice and commitment to Somalia. I also reiterate my condolences to the families of the victims, including the relatives of the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM soldiers who have lost their lives. Now that there has been progress on the security track, the Transitional Federal Government, with the support of its partners, must deliver on the political and development tracks to sustain and consolidate the hard-won gains.

100. Too many civilians have been caught in the crossfire, as much of the fighting is taking place in urban centres. I call on all parties to ensure that they protect civilians, respect humanitarian principles and allow unrestricted delivery of assistance to those in need. I condemn Al-Shabaab's deliberate use of civilians as shields and the launching of attacks from populated areas. The steps taken by AMISOM to mitigate civilian casualties during combat are welcome. The Mission should be given the necessary resources to augment its capabilities in that regard.

101. The current disagreement among the transitional federal institutions over the extension of the transitional period distracts from the urgency of the manifold tasks that are before them. There are immediate needs that must be met: providing basic services, recovery and reconstruction, and humanitarian aid. It is also essential to undertake immediate measures to stabilize the security situation in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, such as reinforcement of police capacity and establishment of basic administrative services. The people of Somalia, especially the thousands of internally displaced persons, deserve to see their lives improved.

102. A second, equally vital area in need of effective leadership in Somalia is the completion of the priority transitional tasks. Chief among them is the constitution-making process, which facilitates national dialogue and reconciliation. Working together, the transitional federal institutions must implement a process that enhances national reconciliation and is credible, consensual and supported by the majority of the Somali population. This includes engaging more Somalis at the regional, community and grass-roots levels. Space must be given to anyone who wants to join the process, including armed opposition groups ready to abandon violence.

103. I am concerned about the drought unfolding in Somalia. The situation is made worse by the ongoing hostilities. People often have no choice but to flee their homes and villages or face starvation and death. This year's humanitarian appeal for Somalia seeks \$529 million for urgent needs. As of April 2011, only one quarter had been funded.

104. Speeding up the deployment of additional troops for AMISOM, as authorized by the Security Council, has never been more urgent. A stronger AMISOM would help the Transitional Federal Government to bring and sustain more territory under its control and to begin delivering services to the Somali people. I welcome the decision by the African Union and the European Union to increase the allowances for AMISOM troops to United Nations levels. I am, however, concerned that resource gaps continue to adversely impact the Mission's effectiveness, possibly discouraging troop contributors. I reiterate the Security Council's call in resolution 1964 (2010) for Member States to contribute generously and promptly to the United Nations trust fund in support of AMISOM without caveats, or to make direct bilateral donations. I thank those Member States and regional organizations which have already responded to this call.

105. I have instructed my Special Representative to focus on the further development of the Somali security sector institutions. They are key to the consolidation of the gains made so far. In the short term, the command and control structures of the Transitional Federal Government forces need to be improved.

106. A strengthened security sector and rule of law in Somalia are also necessary to make a dent in the fight against piracy. I have continually advocated for an


integrated approach to counter piracy that pursues deterrence, security and the rule of law, and development simultaneously.

107. It is difficult to defeat insurgents who are continually supplied with arms, ammunition and goods from outside Somalia, in violation of the arms embargo. I encourage members of the Security Council to take further measures to disrupt Al-Shabaab's supply lines. The African Union has put forward proposals in this regard, including the option of interdicting vessels supplying Al-Shabaab through the port of Kismaayo.

108. I am pleased that the integrated strategic framework has been completed and that UNPOS has reinforced its cooperation with the country team in specific thematic areas. My goal remains full structural integration of the United Nations family in Somalia in the shortest possible time. I intend to submit additional proposals on integration to the Security Council in the coming months.

109. Somalia urgently needs more help from its international partners. It faces levels of violence, damaging weather conditions and insecurity that would shake even stable countries. AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government have made some progress, but they need additional support. The international community must keep its end of the bargain. The Transitional Federal Government urgently needs assistance for Mogadishu's stabilization, recovery and reconstruction. If we reinforce the military gains, provide humanitarian relief and achieve political progress, we can set Somalia on course to greater stability and peace. If we fail, we risk a growing humanitarian crisis, a deteriorating security situation and a worsening threat to regional peace and stability.

110. Finally, I express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative for his dedication and commitment to advancing the cause of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. I also pay tribute to the men and women serving in the United Nations and partner organizations who operate under difficult conditions.





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Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in Chad

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council presidential statement of 20 December 2010 (S/PRST/2010/29), which called upon me to report, by the conclusion of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) liquidation phase on 30 April 2011, on the progress made in eastern Chad on the protection of civilians, especially women and children, including: (a) the status of refugees and internally displaced persons and durable solutions to their displacement; (b) unimpeded, safe and timely humanitarian access, including the movement and security of humanitarian personnel and the delivery of humanitarian aid; (c) the measures taken to respond to violations of humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; and (d) the overall security situation as it affects the humanitarian situation.

2. The present report covers the developments in Chad since the adoption of the presidential statement and the issuance of my previous report on MINURCAT, dated 1 December 2010 (S/2010/611). It provides an assessment of the situation of civilians in Chad and the steps that (both the Government of Chad and the United Nations and humanitarian community) have taken to address the identified protection concerns.

II. Security and political situation

3. During the reporting period, there has been progressive improvement in the security situation in eastern Chad, which continues to be positively affected by the improved relations between Chad and the Sudan. In particular, security along the border with the Sudan has been enforced by the Chad-Sudan joint border force which has been deployed since April 2010 and has increased in size to 5,000 personnel. The mandate of the joint border force expired in March but has been extended until September 2011, and the headquarters of the force has now moved from Abéché in Chad to El Geneina in the Sudan.

4. The majority of combatants (an estimated 16,000) from the Chadian opposition armed groups have returned to Chad from neighbouring countries. There have been no armed clashes in the reporting period between the Chadian security forces and the members of the armed groups that have not yet been demobilized. The last



fighting occurred in April 2010. Remnants of Chadian opposition armed groups, particularly the Union des forces de la résistance (UFR) and the Front populaire pour la renaissance nationale (FPRN), however, remain present outside Chadian territory, in the Sudan and in the north-east of the Central African Republic. Their operational capacity has significantly diminished but the potential for them to carry out hit-and-run operations in Chad remains.

5. There has also been a decline in incidents of banditry in eastern Chad. This can be attributed to the increased presence of the Chadian security forces in the area and their ability to address the criminal networks involved. There have, however, been some security challenges in the southern part of the country, with banditry affecting both civilians and humanitarian workers. The majority of incidents have occurred on the route between Kyabé and Doha, and in the vicinity of Gore. In the absence of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, the risk of armed banditry remains.

6. It is a relatively short time since MINURCAT left Chad on 31 December 2010; however, the withdrawal of the Mission has not, thus far, adversely affected the security situation in eastern Chad. Thanks to ongoing patrols and escorts by the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) and the deployment of the joint border force, there has been improved security and stability in the area. DIS has assumed responsibility for security in and around refugee camps and internally displaced person sites and for humanitarian operations, while the joint border force has secured the border area. Although specific security incidents have been deterred, the local authorities and Chadian security forces still have limited capacity to establish security over vast areas of eastern Chad in which the civilian population remains at risk from banditry and other threats.

7. While the situation has remained calm in Chad, developments in neighbouring countries are cause for concern, particularly along the borders with the Central African Republic, the Sudan and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The situation in the north-east of the Central African Republic remains fragile. The Government is largely absent from Birao, which fell under rebel control in November 2010. The town was retaken by the Government's security forces only with the support of the Chadian National Army, which remained in the Central African Republic until mid-February. The absence of state authorities in the north-east of the Central African Republic has led to an insecure environment in which armed bandits operate at will. Elsewhere, the referendum in Southern Sudan in January had no impact on the security situation in Chad. In the Darfur region, however, armed clashes between new alliances of rebel groups and the Sudanese armed forces have increased in recent months. The clashes have occurred far from the Chadian border and this renewed fighting has, for the moment, had no impact on the security situation in eastern Chad.

8. The uprising in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has not significantly affected Chad and there has not been an influx of refugees from that country into Chad. Chadian nationals caught up in the fighting in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya have, however, started to return. By 8 April, some 17,000 had come back, travelling either by air to N'Djamena or across the border to Faya Largeau. On 23 March, the Government of Chad appealed to the international community to support the repatriation of Chadians wanting to leave the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The Government of Chad has advised that there are 300,000 Chadians living the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as

migrant workers. The crisis in that country is having an impact on the economy of Chad as its markets are mainly supplied from, or through, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Northern Chad, and especially the Sahelian parts of Chad that were affected by drought and chronic malnutrition in 2009, are likely to face a substantial lack of basic supplies. Furthermore, the disruption of remittances by Chadians living in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to their families back home is increasing the vulnerability of the population groups that rely on them.

9. On 11 January, Chad celebrated its fiftieth year of independence. In terms of political developments, animosity between the main political factions has declined and most political parties in Chad participated in the legislative elections held on 13 February in accordance with the political agreement of 13 August 2007. The elections were carried out peacefully, notwithstanding allegations by some opposition parties that there was not a level playing field for all candidates. On 27 February, preliminary results were announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission. The Constitutional Council has also now published the final results, according to which 113 seats out of 188 were won by the ruling party, the Mouvement patriotique du salut. The Constitutional Council, however, subsequently annulled the results of the vote in three districts, representing 13 seats, in which serious irregularities were found.

10. The presidential election scheduled for 3 April was postponed to 25 April. The five opposition candidates have expressed their commitment to the stability of the country but have raised concerns about the electoral process. On 22 March, three opposition candidates suspended their participation, arguing that the conditions for a fair election had not been met and calling upon the Chadian public to boycott the poll. All stakeholders, including the electoral authorities and the political parties, are now working to improve the practical arrangements of the elections with the aim of increasing transparency and accountability. Seventy election monitors from the European Union mission have observed the election process, which has so far been carried out peacefully. Twenty-two United Nations Volunteers are also being deployed to support the Independent National Electoral Commission.

III. Humanitarian situation

11. Despite the improvement in the security situation, the humanitarian needs in Chad remain immense. The country continues to experience a chronic humanitarian crisis, with no significant change in the situation during the reporting period. According to the 2011 consolidated appeals process, 2.5 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Chad out of a population of 11 million. There are still 131,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad and 264,064 Sudanese refugees. A further 64,341 refugees from the Central African Republic are settled in southern Chad. The Chadian population continues to be affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, as well as epidemic outbreaks of disease, such as meningitis, measles, polio, cholera and guinea worm. Meningitis cases have been reported in one of the refugee camps in eastern Chad and a vaccination campaign has been conducted. Polio vaccination campaigns have been organized in areas close to the border with the Sudan, after years of lack of access owing to high insecurity and violence. In total, about 80 (international and national) humanitarian organizations are active in Chad; among them, 54 have operations in eastern Chad, while another

11 have a presence in the Sahelian parts of Chad. The consolidated appeals process for Chad has requested US\$ 506 million and is currently 47 per cent funded.

12. Although malnutrition is a concern in the eastern and Sahelian parts of Chad, where global acute malnutrition rates of between 15 and 28 per cent have been recorded, it also affects other parts of the country. Food security and vulnerability assessments conducted by the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations have revealed that over 2 million people are food insecure in Chad. Over 1 million severely food-insecure people have still not recovered from the drought of 2009 and floods in 2010. Compared to the same period in 2010, the food security situation in the Sahelian parts of Chad has recently improved after a good harvest. The food security situation in pastoral areas, however, is likely to deteriorate for the poorest households, which have lost most of their livestock after two years of successive shocks.

13. Humanitarian assistance remains the predominant form of international support to Chad. With, however, the stabilization of eastern Chad, there is an increased emphasis by the Government of Chad and its international partners on early recovery and longer-term development assistance. The priorities of the Government of Chad have been articulated in its Programme global de relance à l'est du Tchad (PGRET). The programme's goal is to assist people affected by the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad by providing a sustainable solution to their socio-economic challenges, which have been exacerbated by the weakness of such basic services as access to clean drinking water and sanitation, health and education. It also aims to strengthen the capacity of national authorities and local communities to promote sustainable development, and to prevent and respond to crises. PGRET is consistent with the national strategy for growth and poverty reduction, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the consolidated appeals process.

IV. Protection of civilian concerns

Attacks against the civilian population

14. The civilian population in Chad continues to face the daily threat of banditry carried out by armed actors. While the Chadian security forces have brought stability to many areas of the country, they may, through lack of discipline, also be a source of insecurity to civilians. With the departure of MINURCAT, the capacity of the United Nations to monitor and report attacks against the civilian population and other protection concerns has been severely reduced. Not only did the Mission have military deployments in various parts of eastern Chad, but its civilian component included 40 human rights officers and a child protection capacity that, together, provided a comprehensive overview of incidents and trends affecting civilians. The network of local non-governmental organizations in Abéché, Réseau nationale des volontaires à l'est du Tchad, which was previously supported by MINURCAT, continues to undertake human rights monitoring, but its ability to reach many parts of eastern Chad to investigate and verify specific incidents has been seriously curtailed.

Durable solutions for internally displaced persons and refugees

15. During 2010, 50,000 internally displaced persons have returned from displacement sites to their places of origin, mainly in the Dar Sila region and the area of Assoungba. In view of the improved security situation, several thousand internally displaced persons have returned home during the reporting period and more than 10,000 in Dar Sila and Assoungba have requested the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for return assistance. Several internally displaced persons in Koukou Angarana and Goz Beida prefer not to return to their places of origin and have instead opted for local integration by negotiating with traditional chiefs and local authorities to obtain plots of land on which their families may settle.

16. While there have been increased signs of the willingness of internally displaced persons to leave sites of displacement during the reporting period, there has not as yet been a significant and sustained population movement. Security and a fear of banditry in areas of return continue to concern the internally displaced. One of the other key challenges for sustainable returns is the very limited access to basic social services. In most areas of return, potable water sources do not exist, health facilities are very basic, and schools suffer from a lack of qualified teachers and adequate infrastructure. Furthermore, achieving durable solutions for internally displaced persons implies the strengthening of community capacities to develop income-generating activities that would ensure their self-reliance. Without these basic requirements, many internally displaced persons will be unwilling to leave the sites where they have received assistance for several years and enjoyed far better access to basic services than they can expect to receive in their places of origin.

17. The 264,064 Sudanese refugees are hosted in 12 camps in eastern Chad and the 64,341 refugees from the Central African Republic are hosted in 11 camps in southern and south-eastern Chad. Renewed fighting and rebel activities in the north of the Central African Republic towards the end of 2010 led to a new outflow of 2,000 people from the Central African Republic into the Salamat region of south-eastern Chad in February and March. The security situation in the Central African Republic is not conducive to the return of refugees. In addition to increased self-sufficiency and the promotion of local integration opportunities, UNHCR has pursued the resettlement of approximately 500 refugees from the Central African Republic to the United States of America in 2010. Approximately 150 refugees were scheduled to depart from Chad during the reporting period.

18. In N'Djamena, on 28 January, the Governments of Chad and the Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding on mutual cooperation in relation to Sudanese refugees, which sets out a preliminary, bilateral framework for the repatriation of Sudanese refugees currently in Chad. The document underlines that repatriation may only take place on a voluntary basis. UNHCR was not consulted during the negotiation of the document but has offered both Governments technical advice to ensure that any steps towards the repatriation of refugees are taken in full compliance with refugee law, most notably that any return must be secure, voluntary and dignified. Sudanese refugees are, however, very concerned about continued fighting and insecurity in Darfur and most are unwilling to return.

19. In January, the programme for the resettlement of Sudanese refugees from Chad to third countries, which benefits a limited number of vulnerable refugees, was

temporarily suspended at the request of the Government of Chad. The request for the suspension stemmed from bilateral discussions held between the Governments of Chad and the Sudan, and the concern of the latter that the resettlement programme might have a negative impact on the prospect of refugees returning to the Sudan. UNHCR has been negotiating with the Government of Chad the resumption of the programme, particularly with regard to extremely vulnerable refugees who are in need of humanitarian assistance that cannot be provided in Chad, such as urgent medical treatment.

Humanitarian access

20. Humanitarian access in Chad has been primarily affected by banditry and criminal activity, including road ambushes and theft of humanitarian supplies, vehicle hijacking, and break-ins into humanitarian compounds and facilities. Such attacks and thefts have been perpetrated by armed bandits, remnants of former active armed groups in eastern Chad. Compared to two years ago, there has been a significant decrease in the frequency of security incidents that directly impact upon humanitarian operations. This has translated into increased access to affected populations in several areas. In eastern Chad, humanitarian access has increased in tandem with the improved security resulting from the increased operations of DIS, the deployment of the joint border force and the renewed engagement of the national authorities in addressing the security of humanitarian operations.

21. There have, however, been more security incidents affecting humanitarian personnel and operations during the reporting period compared to the same time one year ago, particularly in N'Djamena and southern Chad. On 18 January, a DIS car escorting two UNHCR vehicles was attacked by armed bandits on the road between Kyabé and Daha in southern Chad. Four people were seriously injured, including three DIS officers and one member of the Commission nationale d'accueil et de réinsertion des réfugiés (CNAR), the national refugee body. Risks associated with military operations remain present in the tri-border area of south-eastern Chad, where the joint border force is not deployed. Furthermore, several regions in the north of the country are contaminated with landmines, and major areas in the northern, eastern and south-eastern regions of Chad are contaminated with explosive remnants of war. Humanitarian movements and activities are also constrained by the limited capacity of DIS to provide escorts and by a requirement for non-governmental organizations to obtain permission before undertaking travel in eastern Chad. Several areas of return for internally displaced persons, including Modeina, Koloye, Tiero, Marena and Louboutigue in the Dar Sila region and Borota in the Assoungha area, are among the most affected by limited humanitarian access, as are locations along the border between Chad and the Sudan.

22. The withdrawal of MINURCAT has also reduced the logistical capacity and transport assets available to humanitarian organizations, thereby limiting access to remote areas during the rainy season. The medical evacuation options for humanitarian personnel have been constrained with the departure of MINURCAT. The closure of the Libyan border has also negatively impacted the supply of relief items to Chad. The World Food Programme has been forced to use Port Sudan for the delivery of food to eastern Chad instead of bringing it into the country through Benghazi in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Recruitment and use of children

23. There has only been one reported case of recruitment or the use of children by armed actors during the reporting period: an unconfirmed report of the re-recruitment of a refugee child by the Chadian National Army. It is believed, however, that at present more than one dozen Sudanese refugee children continue to serve in the Chadian security forces or in Sudanese armed groups. Furthermore, four children, aged between 16 and 17 years, were captured during fighting in Birao in the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic late in 2010. They were first detained by the gendarmerie, then released in January and handed over to the Chadian Ministry of Social Action, National Solidarity and Family to be taken care of as part of the national programme of withdrawal, care and rehabilitation of children associated with armed forces and armed groups. In January and February, 30 of these children were reunited with their families in N'Djamena and eastern Chad, with the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross and CARE International. The withdrawal of MINURCAT has, however, adversely affected the capacity of the United Nations to monitor and report on grave violations against children, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). The information provided above therefore does not constitute an exhaustive account of specific incidents affecting children and is not indicative of the scope of violations that may have taken place during the reporting period.

Sexual and gender-based violence

24. During the reporting period, UNHCR and its partners recorded 300 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in the refugee camps in eastern and southern Chad. Most of these cases were perpetrated by civilians. An attempted rape of a refugee was, however, allegedly committed by three Sudanese soldiers in eastern Chad in January. Of the cases recorded by UNHCR, approximately 27 per cent involved children. On 5 January, a 5-year-old girl was raped by an unidentified person in the Koukou Angarana subprefecture. A 9-year-old girl was raped by a 19-year-old man in Farchana, on 25 January. UNHCR received a report of a Chadian girl allegedly gang-raped by three soldiers of the Chadian National Army in February. In Touloum, three cases of rape of under-aged persons were registered in January and February. A further case of rape of a 16-year-old girl on 4 March has been reported, perpetrated by three members of the Chadian National Army during a disarmament mission in the town of Goz Beida.

25. Sexual and gender-based violence remains significantly underreported in Chad. This is not only because cultural taboos inhibit the reporting of cases, but also because most incidents are negotiated and resolved by traditional leaders in the absence of a properly functioning legal system. The information that does exist is provided by UNHCR protection monitoring and the gender-based violence information management system, which was introduced in 2010 as a pilot project by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNHCR for internally displaced persons and host communities in Goz Beida with a view to improving data collection and reporting. That initiative has been replicated at the national level by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UNFPA, in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Action, National Solidarity and Family, in the 10 boroughs of the capital city of N'Djamena. The Government of Chad has recently requested the

further roll-out of this system if the pilot scheme in Goz Beida is successfully implemented.

Human rights violations

26. Recent human rights reports in Chad continue to mention cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. In the gendarmerie post of Massakory, for example, people are reportedly being detained without being presented to the tribunal, based on instructions issued by the Governor in January 2011. In N'Djamena, two human rights defenders of the local non-governmental organization, Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'homme, were reportedly arbitrarily arrested on 6 March and detained incommunicado by members of the National Security Agency. Other cases of arbitrary arrest and intimidation have also been reported in the context of the recent legislative elections. The deplorable detention conditions of the penitentiary system continue to raise serious concerns. Since the withdrawal of MINURCAT, there has been no prison visit to the Maison d'arrêt d'Abéché, or legal aid provided in Abéché. UNHCR has, however, followed up cases of detention of refugees and internally displaced persons, together with its local partners.

27. Chad has made important efforts to ratify international human rights treaties and the Chadian Constitution contains provisions aimed at guaranteeing respect for and protection of human rights, and equal opportunities for citizens. Steps are still required, however, to ensure that these commitments have an impact on the ground. Among the human rights challenges in Chad is the weak capacity of the National Human Rights Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as the lack of a properly functioning judicial and legal system. It is reported that insufficient measures are taken to prosecute those responsible for human rights violations, in particular when they belong to the Chadian security forces. Such acts contribute to the civilian population's lack of confidence in the administration of justice and undermines the efforts of the Government of Chad to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights.

28. A culture of impunity for human rights violations persists in Chad. In January, the President of Chad signed an ordinance granting amnesty for crimes committed in the country by the members of the armed opposition groups. The list of the persons concerned has not been made public. It is important that the amnesty does not extend to war crimes. Indeed, reconciliation in Chad should not come at the detriment of justice and the need for reparations for past human rights violations. Respect for and protection of human rights should be at the centre of all efforts aimed at resolving the country's long-standing conflicts and political problems.

29. On 10 December 2010, MINURCAT and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report on the human rights situation in Chad, covering the period from April 2008 to November 2010. The absence or weak presence of state institutions in most parts of the country creates an environment conducive to human rights violations. The deployment of judicial institutions at the local level has slowed down owing to logistical and security constraints. The insufficient funding of social services limits the full enjoyment of the rights embodied in the Constitution. In addition, cultural practices and barriers, and other social stereotypes, prevent women from taking an active part in the social and political life of the country.

V. Progress made by the Government of Chad in meeting its benchmarks for the protection of civilians

30. The Security Council, in resolution 1923 (2010), took note of the commitment of the Government of Chad, in view of the withdrawal of MINURCAT, to assume full responsibility for the security and protection of the civilian population in eastern Chad and, in so doing, to carry out certain tasks and achieve specific benchmarks related to the protection of civilians. The benchmarks articulated in that resolution are as follows:

(a) Voluntary return and resettlement in secure and sustainable conditions of internally displaced persons;

(b) Demilitarization of refugee and internally displaced person camps as evidenced by a decrease in arms, violence and human rights abuses;

(c) Improvement in the capacity of Chadian authorities in eastern Chad, including national law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and the prison system to provide the necessary security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers with respect for international human rights standards.

31. During the reporting period, the Government of Chad has continued to make steady progress in fulfilling its commitment to meet the above-mentioned three benchmarks.

Voluntary return and resettlement in secure and sustainable conditions of internally displaced persons

32. On 29 December 2010, the Coordination nationale de soutien aux activités humanitaires et au détachement intégré de sécurité (CONSAHDIS) was established as the main interface for the Government of Chad with international humanitarian actors. On 1 March, CONSAHDIS convened in N'Djamena a high-level meeting of relevant government officials, United Nations entities, non-governmental organizations and donor representatives to develop a strategy for assisting those displaced persons that had expressed a desire to return home and had requested reintegration support. The Government of Chad continues to express its desire that displacement should progressively end by the end of 2011 and has appealed to the international community to provide assistance for durable solutions for internally displaced persons. In addition to supporting the return of such persons to their places of origin, stakeholders have been invited to support the other durable solutions, namely, the local integration and resettlement of internally displaced persons. This includes the establishment in various locations in Assoungba and Dar Sila of new villages to which internally displaced persons could be relocated.

33. The Government of Chad has extended state authority and the rule of law, and deployed its security forces in the larger villages and towns in areas of return. UNHCR has stepped up its efforts to assess and monitor the intention of internally displaced persons to seek durable solutions. For example, an exercise has been undertaken to verify the preference of internally displaced persons in Dar Sila and Assoungba to return to their places of origin, to integrate locally or to be resettled. Furthermore, inter-agency monitoring missions to areas of return have recently taken place in the villages of Wadi Kadja, Koley, Dogdore and Adé in order to

confirm the voluntary nature of the decisions of internally displaced persons to return home and assess the protection situation in the locations. Thus far, the monitoring exercise has not revealed any specific concerns, although such persons do face enormous reintegration challenges in their places of origin.

34. It is anticipated that the Ministry of Economy and Planning will soon endorse the durable solutions strategy for internally displaced persons which was drafted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as lead agency of the early recovery cluster approach. The strategy was developed in collaboration with other United Nations entities, non-governmental organizations and national authorities to coordinate and manage assistance aimed at helping internally displaced persons achieve durable solutions. The Government of Chad and the humanitarian community have identified pilot intervention areas for the implementation of projects as part of the durable solutions strategy.

Demilitarization of refugee and internally displaced camps

35. Since the deployment of the joint border force in 2010, UNHCR has observed significant improvement in respect for the civilian and humanitarian character of the refugee camps in eastern Chad. This positive trend has continued during the reporting period. DIS is permanently based around all refugee camps in Chad. All DIS police posts around the camps are operational and have carried out routine activities in recent months. UNHCR has revised the terms of reference of refugee watch committees and has improved the coordination of their activities with DIS and CNAR. It is expected that better coordination and information-sharing will have a further positive impact on the safety and security of the refugees in the camps. In view, however, of the difficulty of accessing refugees in the Salamat region, the location of the refugee camps there, in too close proximity to the border with the Sudan and the general insecurity in the area owing to banditry, the Government of Chad authorized the relocation of the refugee population from the Daha camp to the Moyo camp, which is located 35 km from the border. The relocation of those who opted to move to Moyo took place in April.

36. During the reporting period, UNHCR has not received any reports of the presence of armed persons in internally displaced person sites. The civilian and humanitarian character of such sites, however, remains a challenge as there are no DIS posts to control access to the sites in the same way as refugee camps, although patrols by DIS are carried out on a regular basis.

Security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers with respect for international human rights standards

37. In addition to the deployment of the joint border force, the Government of Chad has also strengthened DIS, which has increased in size from 850 to 1,000 personnel. During the reporting period, DIS expanded its operational area from the east of the country, where it had been located since late in 2008, to provide coverage in the south and south-eastern parts of the country, which have also experienced significant levels of banditry and insecurity. Following the withdrawal of MINURCAT, the Government of Chad pledged to pay the salary and bonuses of DIS

personnel and, with the establishment of CONSAHDIS, has assumed responsibility for the operations of DIS. Patrols carried out by DIS have been effective and are well perceived by the local population and beneficiaries because they facilitate the arrival of humanitarian assistance. Some logistical constraints, however, have prevented DIS from responding to all requests by humanitarian organizations for patrols and escorts.

38. The creation by the Government of Chad late in 2010 of the Bureaux de sécurisation et des mouvements (BSM) in 12 locations (Gore, Abéché, Iriba, Farchana, Goz Beida, Koukou Angarana, Haraze, Maro, Doha, Am Timan, Bahaï and Guéréda) has helped to create a security network to facilitate humanitarian operations. BSM meets on a weekly basis, mainly to evaluate the security situation of the concerned areas, and decides on escorts requested by humanitarian organizations. The smooth functioning of BSM and better coordination between DIS and the humanitarian community has strongly contributed to an improved security environment for humanitarian operations.

39. The fifth and final meeting of the humanitarian forum established pursuant to resolution 1923 (2010) to facilitate a dialogue between the Government of Chad and international partners on a range of humanitarian issues was held on 15 December 2010. The meeting summarized the outcome of the four previous forums, held in N'Djamena, Abéché, Goz Beida and Hadjer Hadid, discussing, respectively, the protection of civilians, humanitarian access, durable solutions for internally displaced persons and early recovery. The humanitarian forums were co-chaired by CONSAHDIS and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, and included representatives from the Government of Chad, United Nations entities, non-governmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The organization of the forums has helped to foster a common understanding by all stakeholders of the humanitarian and protection challenges in Chad. A quarterly follow-up mechanism has been put in place to ensure the review of the recommendations and actions proposed by the forums.

VI. Activities of the United Nations and the international community

40. To assist the Government of Chad in fulfilling its responsibilities with respect to the protection of civilians, the United Nations and its partner international and non-governmental organizations have carried out the activities described below.

Strategy for the protection of civilians

41. In view of the withdrawal of MINURCAT and in order to ensure continuity in the engagement of the United Nations with regard to the protection of civilians in Chad, the Policy Committee that I chair requested on 21 October 2010 that the United Nations country team in Chad develop a comprehensive strategy to address the protection of civilians in eastern Chad. The need for a clear strategy for the protection of civilians was also one of the conclusions reached by the humanitarian forums mentioned above. During the reporting period, UNHCR has led a consultation process with relevant United Nations entities and partners to develop the strategy, in consultation with the Government of Chad. The strategy helps to

clarify the responsibilities that the United Nations country team assumed following the departure of MINURCAT and the ways in which the team can assist the Government of Chad in meeting its obligations in relation to the protection of civilians under international law. The strategy also helps to plan the transition of protection activities from a humanitarian to a development context.

Transfer of responsibility from MINURCAT and strengthening of the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator

42. In December 2010, MINURCAT and the United Nations country team finalized the programme for the consolidation of achievements in eastern Chad, which was approved by the Government of Chad. The programme will ensure an orderly transfer of the activities of the Mission's civilian components to relevant United Nations entities, including in the areas of rule of law and justice, human rights, child protection, gender, mine action and peacebuilding. The transition programme is fully aligned with the comprehensive recovery programme of the Government of Chad, PGRET.

43. With the departure of MINURCAT, the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator has been strengthened to assume the senior leadership role of the United Nations in Chad and to help facilitate the coordination of United Nations assistance during this important transition phase. The office of the Resident Coordinator is currently composed of a multidisciplinary team comprising a coordination specialist, a strategic planning adviser, a peace and development adviser, a human rights adviser and an early recovery adviser. Specific staff have been provided by UNDP, the Development Operations Coordination Office and OHCHR. The team will support the linkages between humanitarian and development programmes. A police adviser was also seconded, with the costs reimbursed by UNDP, from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the office of the Resident Coordinator for three months to support the UNDP and UNHCR joint programme for DIS (see below). Despite these additional resources, further support will be required to strengthen the office.

44. The recent stabilization of eastern Chad represents an opportunity for United Nations support in Chad to increasingly focus on peacebuilding and recovery. The United Nations country team has received bridging support from the Immediate Response Facility of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund to support the continuation of the operations of DIS, following the withdrawal of MINURCAT. A request has also been submitted to the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office for formal declaration of eligibility to access further, longer-term funding from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. This request was drafted in close consultation with the Ministry of Economy and Planning and formally endorsed by the Government. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, however, provides only a catalytic, gap-filling function to finance peacebuilding interventions, which will not meet the substantial needs of the country. Financial assistance from other donors is urgently required to support the peacebuilding and recovery efforts of the Government of Chad.

Technical assistance and support for the D  tachement int  gr   de s  curit  

45. In response to the revised DIS sustainability plan of the Government of Chad presented to the Security Council in October 2010 (see S/2010/536), a United Nations assistance programme for DIS was developed jointly by UNDP and UNHCR, in close collaboration with the Government of Chad. The purpose of the joint programme is to support the Government of Chad in ensuring the continuation of DIS activities with the departure of MINURCAT and in meeting its obligations for the protection of civilians in accordance with resolution 1923 (2010). On 1 March, UNDP, UNHCR and the Government of Chad officially signed off on the joint programme, which will provide support for the administrative and logistical aspects of the operations of DIS. The initial phase of the joint programme has been funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund which released US\$ 2.7 million from its Immediate Response Facility. Other contributors to the joint programme include the European Union, the United States of America and Switzerland, but the programme still faces a shortfall of funding for 2011.

46. As part of the joint programme, UNHCR has assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the DIS fleet of vehicles, the construction of new police posts in the Salamat region in the south of the country, and the maintenance of the police stations initially constructed by MINURCAT. UNHCR is also maintaining the DIS telecommunication and radio network, and supporting capacity-building activities to enhance the ability of DIS to provide safety and security to refugees and internally displaced persons. For its part, UNDP has been working to support CONSAHDIS, including through the deployment of a police adviser to provide advice on the operational oversight of DIS activities. With the support of UNDP, the finalization of the administrative architecture of CONSAHDIS represents an important development towards the continuity of DIS operations in 2011. Internal DIS rules and regulations have been finalized and a DIS disciplinary committee has been established.

47. It is widely recognized, both by the Government of Chad and its international partners, that DIS serves as a temporary solution for ensuring security in eastern Chad and in the long run should not replace the regular Chadian security forces. The issue of DIS opens up the discussion on how to ensure effective security management after the completion of the joint programme through 2011/12. A review of the joint programme scheduled for later in 2011 will begin to explore the modalities for an eventual handover of full responsibility for DIS to the Government of Chad. The future of DIS should be situated in the context of the broader need for security sector reform in Chad and the building of professional and democratically accountable security forces.

Child protection

48. In line with my most recent report on children and armed conflict in Chad, dated 9 February 2011 (S/2011/64), and as part of the transfer of MINURCAT activities to the United Nations country team, the monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave violations against children, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), has continued under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator and the UNICEF representative. The co-chairs of the Task Force on

Monitoring and Reporting in Chad will ensure the fulfilment of reporting obligations to the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and the implementation of the Working Group's conclusions, as well as my recommendations in reports on the situation of children and armed conflict in Chad.

49. The Task Force has begun coordinating the production of information on Chad for the bimonthly global horizontal note. In December 2010, UNICEF started a dialogue with the Government of Chad to draft an action plan to end the recruitment and use of children by the Chadian security forces. Following intensive advocacy during the months of January and February, the Ministry of Social Action, National Solidarity and Family submitted the first draft of the action plan to the Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting in Chad on 3 March. The draft action plan is currently under review and is expected to be signed by the Government of Chad and my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict later in 2011.

Human rights, rule of law and access to justice

50. The United Nations has continued to help promote human rights in Chad with the construction, in February, of the Ecole nationale de la magistrature in N'Djamena. The process for the recruitment of new magistrates is under way. The ongoing development of a national action plan on human rights aims to create in Chad more awareness and capacity in relation to human rights issues. The drafting of the plan under the leadership of the Ministry of Human Rights and the Promotion of Liberties has been inclusive, bringing together relevant government officials, United Nations entities and civil society organizations to design actions to address identified gaps in providing support to Chad for the fulfilment of its international human rights obligations. In the coming months, OHCHR will help to finalize the action plan and ensure its effective implementation.

51. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is also assisting the efforts of the Government of Chad to revitalize the National Human Rights Commission and ensure its compliance with the principles related to the status of national institutions (the "Paris Principles"), most notably with regard to its independence vis-à-vis the executive branch of government. OHCHR and UNDP have also developed a joint project, "Access to justice: the promotion of human rights and gender equality", to strengthen the technical capacity and expertise of staff of the Ministry of Human Rights and the Promotion of Liberties in order to enable the Ministry to better accomplish its mandate to respond to human rights concerns in the context of the planned elections in Chad. Specific training is planned in advance of the presidential elections. OHCHR will subsequently work with the United Nations system to develop a more comprehensive and coordinated training package which will help to strengthen the capacity of the national human rights institutions, the national security and defence forces, and the newly elected members of parliament.

Mine action

52. Civilians in Chad continue to face the threat posed by anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, as well as unexploded ordnance. The most contaminated areas are located in the Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti regions in the north, although other parts

of the country are also affected. On 2 December 2010, Chad was granted a three-year extension until January 2014 to complete the clearance of anti-personnel landmines in accordance with article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Mine Ban Convention). In order to meet this obligation, Chad intends to continue with the large-scale technical survey, launched in 2010 with UNDP and other partners, to determine the scale of contamination in the country. Prior to its withdrawal, the MINURCAT Mine Action Unit consolidated all of the data on mines and explosive remnants of war that it had collected since 2008, and initiated the transfer of these data to the National Demining Centre. Following the departure of MINURCAT and in view of the commitments of Chad under the Mine Ban Convention, UNDP, the United Nations Mine Action Service and UNICEF are considering ways in which to strengthen the national mine action programme through the continuation of the nationwide technical survey, the implementation of landmine and unexploded ordnance clearance operations and mine risk education activities.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform

53. The Government of Chad has indicated its intention to start an official disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, which has been lacking until now. In the second half of 2010, the Government started to develop a first draft of a new national programme and, late in 2010, requested the technical assistance of UNDP to assess the programme to ensure its full compliance with international standards in this field. As currently drafted, however, the programme is not well adapted to the challenges currently facing the country. Furthermore, in view of the security sector reform challenges in Chad and the need to reduce the Chadian National Army to a size commensurate and consistent with the prevailing security situation, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme will need to be revised. A review of the programme is currently under way, bearing these concerns in mind.

VII. Liquidation of the Mission's assets

54. Although MINURCAT officially withdrew from Chad on 31 December 2010, the technical liquidation of the Mission commenced on 1 January and will end on 30 April 2011. During this four-month period, the Mission has liquidated and completed the tasks related to the disposal of United Nations property in accordance with the asset disposal plan approved by the Department for Field Support at the end of 2010. The final disposal of assets is ongoing across the Mission area. Of the total inventory of 18,808 assets, with a combined value of US\$ 132.9 million, about 55 per cent are in the process of being shipped to other United Nations field missions and offices around the world. One per cent of the assets are being sold at residual value to United Nations entities which continue to be based in Chad. More than one third of the Mission's assets are to be disposed of locally through commercial sale or as scrap. About 12.5 per cent of assets are earmarked for donation to the Government of Chad.

VIII. Observations and recommendations

55. Prior to the adoption of resolution 1923 (2010), there was concern that the withdrawal of MINURCAT would have an adverse effect on the situation of civilians and the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate in eastern Chad. In the relatively short time since the Mission withdrew from Chad on 31 December, this has not as yet been the case. Instead, the overall security situation in the country has continued to improve as the Government of Chad has assumed its responsibility for the security and protection of the civilian population.

56. Nevertheless, a number of the root causes of conflict in Chad, such as competition over scarce resources, poor governance and insufficient respect for human rights remain, and the civilian population continues to face the threat of violence. The security situation in Chad also depends on developments in the region that might negatively affect the country. The Security Council should therefore remain vigilant in regard to developments that impact on the civilian population in Chad.

57. Significant progress has been made in achieving the protection benchmarks to which the Government of Chad has committed (see resolution 1923 (2010)). A number have not yet been achieved, however, most notably those relating to durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons. The benchmarks should remain the clear measure by which progress on the protection of civilians in Chad is judged. It is imperative that the United Nations country team urgently finalize both its strategy for the protection of civilians and develop the means by which to measure the progress made.

58. The withdrawal of MINURCAT has had a significant detrimental effect on the ability of the United Nations to comprehensively monitor the situation of civilians and human rights in Chad. While the improvement in the security situation suggests that attacks against civilians have decreased, this cannot be confirmed in the absence of proper human rights monitoring and reporting. The United Nations country team in Chad should urgently strengthen its human rights monitoring capacity.

59. The monitoring and reporting of grave violations against children should also be strengthened to meet the reporting obligations to the Security Council. The Government of Chad should also be encouraged to adopt and implement the draft action plan on the recruitment and use of children.

60. Durable solutions need to be found for the thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons living in eastern Chad. Most immediately, an operational plan should be developed by the Government of Chad, with the support of the United Nations, to help internally displaced persons who have expressed a desire either to return home or seek other durable solutions. The Government of Chad should also complete the ratification process of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons and endorse the durable solutions strategy developed in conjunction with UNDP.

61. Despite the withdrawal of the Mission, DIS continues to provide security in and around refugee camps and internally displaced person sites, and provides escorts for humanitarian organizations to carry out their operations. DIS, however, represents only a temporary solution to the security problem in eastern Chad and

should be phased out. The priority now is a clear plan for security sector reform and the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Chad. The fostering of professional and accountable security forces in Chad is vital for the protection of civilians.

62. Thousands of people remain in need of humanitarian assistance in Chad. Because of the chronic nature of the humanitarian situation, increasing emphasis should be placed on recovery and peacebuilding to facilitate the transition from relief to development. Only by addressing the root causes of conflict through longer-term development interventions will Chad be able to avoid the cycle of violence that has affected the country and its civilian population over recent years.

63. There is currently a funding gap for this important transition phase. A declaration of eligibility for the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund is a key priority, although support from the Fund will only be able to meet a small proportion of the peacebuilding and recovery needs in Chad. The United Nations country team should therefore develop a resource mobilization strategy and donors encouraged to support Chad during this critical phase in the transition towards long-term development.

64. The experience of Chad is unique in that there has been no successor political or peacebuilding United Nations presence following the departure of the peacekeeping mission. There are important lessons that can be learned from the experience, not least in terms of measuring progress regarding the protection of civilians and how this should be linked to the decision-making process by the Security Council and other stakeholders for a peacekeeping mission drawdown. The handing over of certain responsibilities of MINURCAT to the United Nations country team has been smooth, but general guidance on such transitions will need to be developed for other contexts.

**Security Council**

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2 May 2011
English
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**Letter dated 2 May 2011 from the President of the Security Council
addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 25 February 2010 (S/2010/103), concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Antti Turunen (Finland) as the United Nations representative to the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and the international discussions in Geneva on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They have taken note of your intention and of the information contained in your letter.

President of the Security Council
(Signed) Gérard Araud



**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
4 May 2011

Original: English

**General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East
Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory****Security Council
Sixty-sixth year****Identical letters dated 2 May 2011 from the Permanent Observer
of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council**

I am compelled to draw your attention today to yet another act of collective punishment being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people and to place on record the adamant rejection of the Palestinian leadership of this latest illegal, provocative act as well as all other illegal actions that continue to be perpetrated by the occupying Power.

On Sunday, 1 May, the Israeli Minister of Finance declared the suspension of the transfer of taxes that are collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority by Israel, the occupying Power, in line with interim agreements concluded between the two sides. When publicizing the decision, Israeli officials have claimed that this illegal measure is being undertaken in response to the announcement of an agreement regarding Palestinian unity and reconciliation. This provocative Israeli declaration is a clear reflection of the malicious intentions of the occupying Power towards the Palestinian people and their leadership, and is unquestionably a consequence of international inaction towards Israel's consistent violations of its obligations under international law, including its continued illegal settlement activities throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which has emboldened Israel's defiance and impunity.

Suspending the transfer of tax revenues and other levies due to the Palestinian National Authority constitutes an illegal act of piracy. It must be confronted by the international community, as it represents yet another deliberate illegal act by the occupying Power against the Palestinian people. Moreover, the withholding of tax income will have detrimental consequences for the lives and living standards of the Palestinian civilian population across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, constituting a clear act of collective punishment, which is strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law. At the same time, this provocative act will seriously undermine the widely recognized and internationally supported



State-building efforts of the Palestinian Authority. Such an action also constitutes deliberate Israeli interference in the internal affairs of the Palestinian people, and the pretexts and threats being used by the occupying Power are similar to those used over the years in its long-standing attempts to thwart the two-State solution for the benefit of perpetuating the status quo of its illegitimate occupation, settlements and oppression of the Palestinian people and suppression of their right to self-determination and independence.

The Palestinian people have suffered the devastating consequences of internal strife for over four years, and they have unanimously called for an end to the division. Moreover, an international consensus has long been voiced on the necessity of achieving Palestinian unity and reconciliation, particularly for the achievement of the legitimate national aspirations of the Palestinian people. Thus, the recent announcement by the Palestinian leadership on the signing of a unity agreement, as a result of serious intra-Palestinian dialogue and ongoing Egyptian efforts, has received support from throughout the international community. Accordingly, we welcome the recent statement in this regard by Your Excellency, reflecting a responsible position in support of Palestinian unity within the framework of the Palestinian Authority, led by President Mahmoud Abbas and the commitments of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In this regard, we must recall that the calls for Palestinian unity have been consistently made not only in the region by the Arab countries and the League of Arab States but also internationally, particularly as called for by the Security Council in resolution 1860 (2009) and in Quartet statements, including the statement of 19 March 2010 in Moscow.

Now that Palestinian political factions are poised to sign a unity agreement, it would be entirely unacceptable to permit Israel, the occupying Power, to interfere in this internal Palestinian affair in order to promote its own illegitimate agenda and at the same time undermine the efforts to resume the peace process towards the achievement of an end to the occupation that began in 1967 and the conclusion of a peace settlement. Giving audience or credence to the provocative arguments, incitement and threats being made by Israel, which has consistently and blatantly violated all of its obligations under international law, would be totally unacceptable and would risk completely sabotaging the serious efforts being made by the Palestinian leadership under President Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad for the realization of peace and security. Instead, Israel, the occupying Power, must be compelled to comply with international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, and should be reminded that the shortest path to peace is through the fulfilment and endorsement of these obligations. The international community must put an end to these ongoing Israeli attempts to divert attention from the real priority, which is achieving peace in the region by ending its 44 years of belligerent occupation and ending its subjugation of the Palestinian nation.

The picture has never been so clear, and the world has never been as united in endorsing this vision for achieving peace. At this stage in history, turning the clock backwards is neither possible nor acceptable. The Palestinian people will continue their march towards their freedom, statehood and justice. The international community, including the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, now have the moral and legal obligation to fulfil their responsibilities for the realization of this historic and just solution, and this requires immediate efforts to end Israel's contempt for international law and truly promote peace.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 389 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 8 April 2011 (A/ES-10/516-S/2011/229), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Riyad Mansour**
Ambassador

Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations